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The Taking of America?
Stefanie Sovak*
Introduction
The land use issues facing our nation and how we address
them are critical. The United States population is expected to
grow 48.8 percent by 2050 (from 2000),' exerting pressure on
availability of natural resources, infrastructure, jobs and the
housing required to support a population of nearly 420 million
people. 2 How do we house another 138 million people and at the
same time preserve our open space, endangered species, clean
air and water? How can we adequately provide infrastructure
for waste disposal, transportation, water and power? How do
we provide affordable housing?
A confluence of forces with primarily good inten-
tions?social, legal, economic and environmental?has taken a
sledge hammer to the rights of individual property owners. For
over two centuries, our legislation and common law have im-
posed increasingly restrictive regulations on individual prop-
erty rights, adopting an "ends-justifies-the-means" philosophy.
* Stefanie Sovak is an evening student at Pace University School of Law, J.D.
candidate 2009. After graduating from Georgetown University in 1984, Ms. Sovak
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as a Senior Vice President of Marketing and Business Development for a financial
services technology firm. Today Ms. Sovak owns a real estate services and broker-
age firm and is a licensed New York State real estate broker. She develops, con-
sults and invests in small real estate properties in New York and North Carolina.
Additionally she holds a position as a part time legal assistant at a respected
White Plains, NY law firm. Ms. Sovak would like to acknowledge the incredible
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1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. INTERIM PROJECTIONS BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN, available at http://www.census.gov.ipc/www/usinterimproj/nat-
projtabOlb.pdf.
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. INTERIM PROJECTIONS BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND
HISPANIC ORIGIN, available at http://www.census.gov.ipc/www/usinterimproj/nat-
projtabOla.pdf.
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Today municipalities can legally impose a vast range of increas-
ingly restrictive regulations on private property: regulations
that dictate the color of the mortar that can be used between
bricks;3 regulations that mandate not only the height, but the
color and material of which a fence can be made; 4 regulations
that allow the taking of a private home for the sake of a (theo-
retically) more economically beneficial replacement;5 and regu-
lations that render fifty percent of city's lots uninhabitable for
people but habitable for woodpeckers, 6 all under the mantra of
"for the general welfare."7
In attempting to address critical issues in land use, we
have all but obliterated the Constitutional protection of prop-
erty rights for the individual. Our Constitution was supposed
to provide the fundamental parameters to limit the means by
which essential land use objectives were met.s It was supposed
to ensure that the police power vested in local governments did
3. THE CORNWALL ON HUDSON MASTER PLAN COMMITTEE, DESIGN GUIDELINES
FOR THE VILLAGE OF CORNWALL ON HUDSON 11 (2005-2006), available at http:l/
www.cornwall-on-hudson.org/Minutes/Master%20Plan%2OCommittee/CoH%20
Plan%20New%20Construction%2OGuidelines%206.19.06.pdf.
4. Id. at 9.
5. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
6. Jonathan Spiers, Town Commissioners Study Paying for Bird Mitigation,
THE STATE PORT PILOT, January 24, 2007, at 3A. The article cites that "2,704 par-
cels-roughly half of those in the city-are restricted from immediate development
.... At issue is whether "the cost to mitigate endangered woodpecker habitat
prior to development can be charged to landowners whose properties are affected
rather than the city's residents at large." Id. This is a quintessential example of
what the future holds: A federal agency, Fish and Wildlife, imposes a moratorium
on half of a small city's land, bringing the growth of the area to a halt, as well as
halting the retirement dreams of many individual landowners. The moratorium
was imposed on the small city with no plan in place, forcing responsibility on the
city, economic loss on landowners and the city, with no accountability on the fed-
eral agency for the havoc it has left behind. If preservation of the woodpeckers is
for the general welfare of the people, why is it asserted that only a select number of
landowners must pay? Ostensibly, the endangered woodpeckers are being saved
for the enjoyment of all, thus all should pay for that enjoyment. Conversely, if
saving the woodpecker is important to a select few, then perhaps that select few
should pay.
7. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 33 (1954).
8. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 132 (1992).
"From its inception, one scholar noted, 'the Court deemed its mission to be the
protection of property against depredations by the people and their legislatures.
After 1937 it gave up this mission."' Id. (quoting LEO PFEFFER, THIS HONORABLE
COURT: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 322 (Beacon Press
1965)).
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not expand beyond the property rights endowed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.9 It was supposed to protect the
individual against abuses of power by the economically or politi-
cally advantaged. It was supposed to provide protection for a
minimal set of fundamental rights, specifically the right to life,
liberty and property. 10 It was supposed to be as important as
our fundamental right to free speech, but instead, it has been
subject to a mere rational basis test by the Court."
The degradation of property rights has not been without re-
action. It is unclear whether this reaction will spur a response
in the form of prudent or imprudent property rights reform. In-
creasingly restrictive regulations have largely been imple-
mented at the expense of a select number of property owners.
These encroachments have, until recently, occurred quietly.
The results, while legal, have been alarming in their practical
application. There is a growing realization that if property reg-
ulation continues to be left unchecked, any one of us can wake
up tomorrow and find that our home has been taken for the ben-
efit of the public welfare. 12 Outrage 3 and publicity generated
from the Kelo v. City of New London' 4 decision have sparked a
fire in a fledgling property rights movement, leading to reac-
tionary legislation in many states. 15 The most notable example
is Oregon's Measure 37, where "voters in Oregon approved a
sweeping regulatory takings ballot initiative ... allowing indi-
vidual landowners to claim compensation from the local com-
9. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV.
10. U.S. Const. amend. V.
11. David L. Callies, Public Use: What Should Replace the Rational Basis
Test?, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 82 (Dwight H. Mer-
riam & Mary Massaron Ross eds., 2006). "The critical issue is: with what standard
should the Court replace its overly deferential and clearly misused rational basis
test?" Id.
12. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). "Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party
.
Id.
13. See Dick M. Carpenter, II & Johnson K Ross, Victimizing the Vulnerable,
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, June 2007, at 1 (referring to Kelo v. City of New London as
"one of the most reviled U.S. Supreme Court decisions in history ..
14. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
15. CASTLE COALITION, 50 STATE REPORT CARD: TRACKING EMINENT DOMAIN
REFORM LEGISLATION SINCE KELO (August 2007).
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munity for any decrease in property value due to planning,
environmental or other government safeguards." 16
What are the "right" regulations? Supporting the demands
of population growth while at the same time protecting natural
resources will not be achieved by ignoring our fundamental and
constitutional right to property. If it is true that providing af-
fordable housing and preserving natural resources are unified
objectives of "the people," then all of "the people" should share
in the burden of achieving those objectives. How do we preserve
a cornerstone of our economy, namely the wealth individuals
hold in their property? How do we ensure that the Constitu-
tional right to property is not sacrificed to the latest trend in
urban renewal or social engineering?
There appears to be no easy answer. It will take the best
and the brightest to deliver compromises that are effective.
Without recognition, participation and input from all voices, ra-
tional solutions will elude us.
This paper will address the first of three categories of regu-
lation and common law that profoundly affect property rights in
America. In this first category, "takings" are viewed not simply
in their traditional sense, but rather through the lens of a con-
tinuum: (a) from the obvious taking which results in a title
transfer of property; (b) to the less obvious regulatory taking,
whereby a piece of property is rendered valueless because of a
new regulation; (c) to the insidious "taking" of property rights
found in zoning and subdivision regulations, the latest of these
being the "design guideline." The second and third categories of
regulation and common law that affect American property
rights cover the environmental regulations and procedural ju-
risprudence that govern land use. These latter categories are
16. AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, ATTACK OF THE MEASURE 37 CLONES,
available at http://www.planning.org/legislation/measure37. The APA keeps run-
ning statistics of legislation in regulatory takings areas reporting the following
results: State and Local Regulatory Takings Ballot Measures Updated December
6, 2006, Takings Ballot Initiatives-Defeated (3), TAKINGS BALLOT INITIA-
TIVES-PASSED (1), TAKINGS BALLOT INITIATIVES-REMOVED FROM BALLOT (5), EMI-
NENT DOMAIN BALLOT MEASURES-PASSED (10), LocAL REGULATORY TAKINGS
BALLOT MEASURE-DEFEATED (1), LocAL EMINENT DOMAIN BALLOT MEA-
SURE-PASSED (1). Id. See also Ronald D. Utt, States Vote to Strengthen Property
Rights, BACKGROUNDER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 3 No. 2002 (February 1,
2007). In February of 2006, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld Measure 37.
132 [Vol. 28:129
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critically important to the dialogue surrounding the question of
"What are the right regulations?" They have contributed
equally, if not more, to the degradation of property rights in
America than have takings. However, the enormity of each sub-
ject requires a separate study and thus neither of them will be
addressed here.
I. Eminent Domain Under the Power of the Fifth
Amendment: So Just What is the Definition of
"Public Use"?
The Supreme Court has moved away from its original nar-
row definition of public use and has substituted "public purpose"
in its stead. 17 In its Fifth Amendment analysis, the Court has
expanded the definition of public purpose to include all acts that
fall under the auspices of police power.18 Further, the definition
of police power has evolved from that of protecting the public
from harm to allowing actions that are for the greater good. In
essence, no practical Constitutional protection of property own-
ership remains. A Constitutional, fundamental right to prop-
erty has been transformed into a conditional privilege that is
subject to the whim of the powerful. 19 Without change, this
paves the way for a return to a feudal-like property system,
where the right to use is the maximum right, and is subject to
the wishes of the sovereign. 20
An understanding of the evolution of American property
rights is best begun with its historical antecedents. The "'ac-
quisition and cultivation of land was the very raison d'etre for
the colonies."' 21 "To Europeans the American continent repre-
17. See generally Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S.
527 (1906); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley, 164
U.S. 112 (1896).
18. See generally Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
19. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). "Any property may now be taken for the benefit of another private party,
but the fallout from this decision will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely
to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political pro-
cess, including large corporations and development firms." Id.
20. E.F. Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (Nov.
1971).
21. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 10 (1992) (quot-
ing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOL-
2007] 133
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sented a boundless opportunity for speculation and develop-
ment; indeed the prospect of new land was the main economic
inducement for colonization." 22 This desire for land was a factor
in an ongoing evolution in the English rejection of the feudal
system of land use. After the Norman Conquest, land was held
by the King, who in turn gave his trusted allies use rights in the
land that were conditioned on provision of services to the
King.23 Ownership remained with the King. Over several cen-
turies, this system of land use evolved:
In England, as in western Europe generally, land was the princi-
pal source of wealth and social status. Yet landownership was
tightly concentrated in relatively few hands, and most individuals
had no realistic prospect of owning land. Moreover, in theory no
person owned land absolutely: All land was held under a tenurial
relationship with the crown. Although there was a bewildering
variety of tenure arrangements, property ownership was condi-
tional and involved continuing obligations to a superior. By the
seventeenth century, these obligations took the form of quitrents,
annual payments to the king or overlord. Feudal in origin, the
quitrent was regarded as a type of taxation.24
The settlement of the American colonies required a differ-
ent view of land ownership. Trading companies used generous
land grants as incentives to lure settlers. Outside of New York,
most land was granted under the "headright system," granting
50 to 150 acres as titles in fee simple.25 New York, however,
initially instituted a system of patroonships, which granted
enormous tracts of land to proprietors. The proprietors in turn
leased, rather than sold, portions of the land to individuals, a
system with similarities to the feudal system. The desire to
own land forced settlers to other colonies and caused severe so-
cial unrest, resulting in agrarian riots in 1776.26 "The unrest in
OGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 191
(1980)).
22. Id.
23. John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A
Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, in LAND USE
LAw COURSE SUPPLEMENT FALL 2006 2 (2006).
24. ELY, supra note 8, at 11.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 12.
[Vol. 28:129
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New York vividly confirmed the central place of property owner-
ship in colonial thinking."27
An examination of the Takings Clause's inclusion in the
Bill of Rights reveals very little of the Founders' thinking.28 Al-
though the States proposed many amendments to the Constitu-
tion, none submitted a proposal for the Takings Clause.
Instead, James Madison included it in his first proposal of a
draft bill of rights that was distilled from the States' inputs.29
During committee discussion, Madison's proposal was modified
slightly from his first version that no person "'be obliged to re-
linquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use,
without a just compensation,"' 30 to "'nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation.' 31 No fur-
ther changes were made during House and Senate debate, and
there is no record of what was said relating to the Takings
Clause during the state ratifying conventions. 32 Legal scholars
David Dana and Thomas Merrill infer from this uneventful in-
clusion of the clause that the "Takings Clause most likely was
perceived as effecting no change in the legal status quo with
respect to government takings of property,"33 most probably be-
cause the notion was already included in the state constitu-
tionS3 4 and derived from the accepted similar clause in the "time
honored guarantees of [the] Magna Carta (1215)." 35
In one of its earliest decisions relating to the subject, the
Court stated that "an ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it
a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social com-
pact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative au-
thority. '36 The Court then went on to provide several examples
of what would not be rightful exercises of legislative authority,
including "a law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It
is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legis-
27. Id.
28, DAVID DANA & THoMAs MERRILL, PROPERTY TAKINGS 9 (2002).
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
31. Id. (quoting EDWARD DUMBAUL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 162 (2d ed. 1979)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 15.
34. ELY, supra note 8, at 32.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
2007]
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lature with SUCH powers .... ,37 Interestingly enough, the
Court's commentary specifically addressed its own authority,
and any limits thereto, to invalidate state legislation when it
violated the Constitution.38 For almost the next hundred years,
courts came "to see laws or acts which 'took from A to give to B'
as the paradigmatic abuse of government authority."3 9
The Court did not however, hold that the right to property
is absolute. It addressed the need for eminent domain for legiti-
mate public use, which "mostly involved takings of vacant strips
of land for irrigation ditches, and other easements."40 In Fall-
brook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley,41 an 1896 case, which is often
inaccurately cited as a takings case, the Court provided sub-
stantial dicta on its definition of public use. It first acknowl-
edged that the state courts were not consistent in the definition
of public use, some defining it broadly and some narrowly. 42
Further, that public use "largely depends upon the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the particular subject-matter in re-
gard to which the character of the use is questioned,"4 but
clearly the need for irrigation in the vast, arid lands of Califor-
nia constituted a public use by any standards.44 What is most
interesting about the Falibrook case is that its subsequent mis-
interpretation as a case of condemnation ultimately laid the
groundwork for today's equating of public use with public
purpose:
Justice Peckham ... erroneously asserted in Clark v. Nash that
Falibrook was a condemnation case by a corporation that was
seeking to take private property for irrigation (it was nothing of
the sort), and where he confused public purpose with public
use.... [Ilt was not a condemnation case as asserted by Justice
Peckham in Clark, but rather a due process challenge to the dis-
trict's legitimacy in performing its function of providing water for
37. Id. (emphasis in original).
38. See generally id.
39. Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Citizens Get Meaningful
Eminent Domain Reform?, in SL049 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY JANUARY 5-7,
2006 703, 710 (2006).
40. Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad
Judgment, 38 URB. LAw 201, 205 (SPRING 2006).
41. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
42. Id. at 158.
43. Id. at 160.
44. See generally id.
136 [Vol. 28:129
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irrigation, and of its taxation powers to accomplish that purpose.
No one sought to condemn any property from Ms. Bradley (the
plaintiff). Rather, she sued to enjoin the sale of her land located
within district boundaries, which was to be sold because of her
refusal to pay a circa $50 assessment lien against it. She ad-
vanced the odd argument that the Due Process Clause deprived
the district of any power to levy the assessment because it was
said to lack a public purpose and was thus illegitimate.... Thus,
even if viewed erroneously as an eminent domain case, Fallbrook
spoke a classic instance of use by the public, which by any stan-
dard was clearly within the ambit of even the most literal con-
struction of the "public use" clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Nonetheless, nine years later, in Clark v. Nash, Justice Peckham
somehow perceived Fallbrook to have been an eminent domain
case in which a corporation sought to condemn water rights. His
error in finding a holding in Fallbrook that "public purpose" in the
context of a substantive due process case was synonymous with
"public use" within the meaning of the Eminent Domain Clause,
hardened into law when Clark was unwittingly accepted as prece-
dent a year later .... in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co. in which, without any analysis whatever, he simply relied
solely on the holding of Clark that in turn relied on the nonexis-
tent Fallbrook holding. 45
Regardless of whether one believes that Kanner's assessment is
correct, it is clear that Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining
Co. 46 laid the groundwork for the transition whereby use by the
general public as a universal test for the public use was no
longer considered adequate by the courts. In Strickley, which
actually was a condemnation case, Highland Boy Mining Com-
pany ("Highland") sought to obtain a right of way for an aerial
bucket line to carry ores and other things from the mines for
itself and others to the railway station. The facts show that
Highland made "diligent inquiry" to find the owner of the placer
claim but when unsuccessful, put up the structure and paid into
the court the value of the right of way. Strickley, on the other
hand, was found to have stood by and watched the erection of
the structure without making his right known.47 Strickley's ar-
gument was that the right of way was not for public use but
45. Kanner, supra note 40 at 222-23 (citations omitted).
46. 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
47. Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 529-30 (1906).
2007]
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rather was for private use and thus in violation of his Four-
teenth Amendment rights. Highland claimed that Utah Stat-
utes specifically defined public uses as on behalf of "smelting, or
other reduction of ores, or the working of mines."48 Thus, the
condemnation was, in Highland's view, authorized by state
laws. The question for the Court was then to determine if the
Utah state law was constitutional. The Court stated that the
question was "pretty nearly answered by the recent decision in
Clark.. . [that] [i]n discussing what constitutes a public use, it
recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as a uni-
versal test."49 Further, the Court framed the question by stat-
ing that if the public welfare of the state demands that the right
of way be given, the Constitution "does not require us to say
that they are wrong."50 Thus, the foundation for three distinct
threads of takings jurisprudence emerges: first, that public use
may be equated with public purpose; second, that the public
welfare, or police power, is a legitimate public purpose; and
third, that private parties may be the conduit to achieve the
public welfare if no other means are available.
A. Modern Takings Jurisprudence
Some fifty years later, the Court decided the seminal case
of Berman v. Parker,51 allowing the District of Columbia Rede-
velopment Land Agency (Agency) to condemn an unblighted de-
partment store in a blighted neighborhood because "it was
hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be controlled and
the birth of future slums prevented."52 In this astounding deci-
sion, the Court cemented all of the basic tenets of today's tak-
ings jurisprudence. First, it gave unfettered discretion to the
legislature to define the extent of police power and then pro-
vided almost absolute deference to that legislation. "The defini-
tion [of police power] is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government ....
[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
48. Id. at 530.
49. Id. at 531.
50. Id.
51. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
52. Id. at 35.
138 [Vol. 28:129
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declared in terms well-nigh conclusive." 3 In furtherance of
broadening the police power, Justice Douglas said:
The values it [the public welfare] represents are spiritual as well
as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-bal-
anced, as well as carefully patrolled.54
Second, the Berman decision "confused the exercise of the police
power with the exercise of the power of eminent domain when
[Justice Douglas] asserted that in dealing with eminent do-
main, the Court was dealing with the police power." 55 Third,
the decision sanctioned the taking of property from private
owner A and giving it to private owner B because the ends jus-
tify the means, "For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to the end .... Here one of the means chosen is the use
of a private enterprise for the redevelopment of the area."56
Last, Justice Douglas all but rewrote the Constitution himself,
for the only place where the words "public use" are present are
in his quoting of the D.C. ordinance and the Fifth Amend-
ment.57 Thereafter, Justice Douglas used the phrase "public
purpose" without even acknowledging a distinction.58 In sum,
"to follow Justice Douglas' notion in Berman that the [police
powers and eminent domain powers] are one, was to let the
broad, and doctrinally ill-defined 'public purpose' police power
justification swallow the specific, narrower 'public use' limita-
tion, thereby de facto reading it out of the Constitution. '59
Thirty years later, Justice O'Connor began her analysis in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkif °60 by referencing Berman.6 1
In Midkiff, the State of Hawaii sought to remedy a land oligop-
oly on the island created by a historical feudal land tenure sys-
tem by condemning property and then transferring it from the
lessors to the lessees. The Hawaii Legislature discovered that
53. Id. at 32.
54. Id. at 33.
55. Kanner, supra note 40 at 211.
56. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
57. Id. at 29, 31.
58. See generally id.
59. Kanner, supra note 40 at 211.
60. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
61. Id. at 239.
2007] 139
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forty-seven percent of the State's land was in the hands of only
seventy-two landowners, concluding that this ownership dispar-
ity was responsible for "inflating land prices and injuring the
public tranquility and welfare."62
Citing Berman, O'Connor used the premise "[t]he 'public
use' requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sover-
eign's police power,"6 3 as the foundation of her analysis. Hence,
the entire analysis in Midkiff is based upon the review of a po-
lice power decision, not a review of deprivation of fundamental
rights. O'Connor did admit, "[t]here is, of course a role for
courts to play in reviewing a legislature's judgment of what con-
stitutes a public use, even when the eminent domain power is
equated with the police power. But the Court in Berman made
clear that it is 'an extremely narrow' one."64 O'Connor again re-
ferred to Berman to intertwine eminent domain and police
power, reaffirming the error that the test for eminent domain
takings is the rational basis test.65 "But where the exercise of
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking
to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause."66 Even the most ru-
dimentary class in Constitutional Law teaches that deprivation
of a fundamental right requires strict scrutiny by the Court.
Next, Justice O'Connor addressed the issue of public use,
using the words "public purpose" not "public use," just as was
done in Berman.67 The analysis goes on to articulate that al-
though the title to the lands passed directly from one private
land owner to another; "The Act advances its purposes without
the State's taking actual possession of the land. In such cases,
government does not itself have to use property to legitimate
the taking; it is only the taking's purpose, and not its mechan-
62. Id. at 232. Aside from issues surrounding the correctness of the Midkiff
decision, it is interesting to note that nearly 49 percent of the land was owned by
the state and federal government. Perhaps there was not only another source of
the oligopoly problem, but a solution that would not require the taking of property
from private property owners?
63. Id. at 240.
64. Id.
65. "But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related
to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to
be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." Id. at 241.
66. Id. at 241.
67. See generally Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
[Vol. 28:129
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ics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause."68 It
is also the State's purpose that determines, under the rational
basis test, whether the taking was justified. Ultimately, the
Court concluded, "[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associated
with it is a classic exercise of a State's police powers. We cannot
disapprove of Hawaii's exercise of this power."69 In this case,
however, as in all other land use decisions, great deference is
afforded to local legislative decisions, and no assessment is
made on the soundness of those decisions nor is anyone held
accountable for the outcomes.
Thus by the time that Kelo v. City of New London70 was
decided in 2005, it should have been foreseeable that the Court
would decide in favor of the City, not the landowner(s). In 1798,
the Court clearly indicated that it was against all reason and
justice for people to entrust a Legislature with such powers as
taking property from A and giving it to B. 71 By 1896, the Court
said the definition of public use "largely depend[ed] upon the
facts and circumstances surrounding the particular subject-
matter .... ,72 In 1905, the Court confused the Fallbrook hold-
ing as a condemnation case rather than a substantive due pro-
cess case and then used the Fallbrook holding in Clark. Clark
then laid the groundwork for changing the definition of public
use to public purpose, and by 1906, the Court cemented the er-
ror in Strickley. The Court stated that use by the general public
is not the test for public use-that if the public welfare de-
mands a right of way that demand is adequate justification, and
it is not for the Court to judge the wisdom of any police power
justification. 73 In 1954, the Court used the classic "ends justi-
fies the means" holding, giving local government unfettered dis-
cretion in defining police power by articulating a list that
excluded nothing. The Court then succinctly stated that when
dealing with eminent domain, the Court was dealing with police
power, and defined public "use" as public "purpose," without so
much as an acknowledgement of the change.74 It is now simply
68. Id. at 244.
69. Id. at 242 (citations omitted).
70. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
71. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798).
72. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
73. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906).
74. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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an accepted definition. The 1984 case of Midkiff stated that the
public use requirement was "coterminous" 75 with the scope of
police power, and clearly articulated that the test is the rational
basis test.76
B. The Effect of the "New" Definition of Public Use
In the now infamous Kelo v. City of New London77 decision,
the city of New London used eminent domain to take the prop-
erty of Susette Kelo and transfer it to a private entity. The case
has come to stand for the notion that economic development is a
valid public use under the Fifth Amendment. Kelo's home was
not blighted, nor was the area blighted. Rather, the justifica-
tion was that the redevelopment of the area would bring in sub-
stantial tax revenue and jobs and would take advantage of the
recent relocation of the Pfizer Corporation to New London. 78
The Court simply expanded the definition of public use under
the Fifth Amendment allowing the government to transfer
property from one private owner to another "simply on the
ground that the new owner is expected to make a greater contri-
bution to the local economy." 79 If one analyzes the decision us-
ing the rational basis test for reviewing a police power decision,
then it makes sense. It is certainly within the local legislative
authority to act in the interest of the general health, welfare,
safety and morals of the community; it is not within the Court's
authority to judge the wisdom of local police power acts-only to
review if there is some rational basis for the act. In using
Berman and Midkiff, the Court justifies the transfer of the
property from one private owner to another on the grounds that
the ends justify the means. Thus there is some rational basis
for the "end," constituting a valid police power act. If one agrees
that the public use requirement is "coterminous" with the scope
of police power as O'Connor stated in the Midkiff decision,80 the
Kelo holding should have been much ado about nothing.
75. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
76. See id.
77. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
78. See id.
79. Ilya Somin, Robin Hood In Reverse: The Case Against Economic Develop-
ment Takings, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS Feb. 21, 2005 No. 535 at 2, availa-
ble at http://www.cato.orgfpub-display.php?pubid=3678.
80. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
142 [Vol. 28:129
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss1/6
THE TAKING OF AMERICA?
So why was there such an enormous backlash to the Kelo
decision? Economic development takings were not new, the
most egregious of these being the 1981 Poletown decision of the
Michigan Supreme Court.81 In Poletown, the court justified "de-
stroying an entire neighborhood and condemning the homes of
4,200 people, as well as numerous businesses, churches, and
schools, so that the land could be transferred to General Motors
for the construction of a new factory."8 2 Perhaps the enormous
backlash to Kelo arose because Kelo represents the Supreme
Court's ratification, in a single case, of individual threads sown
into the Court's decisions since Clark. Put together, the synthe-
sis of these threads culminated in a decision that offends some
Americans' sense of justice. The decision subjects the largest
asset of most middle class Americans to takings by the govern-
ment with little more justification than an empty promise of
greater tax revenue.8 3 Worse, programs using takings under
the guise of economic development simply do not work as prom-
ised.8 4 Perhaps the backlash arose because:
fundamental fairness is said to be an attribute of American con-
stitutional law, particularly where the Bill of Rights is concerned,
it is unfortunate that faultless citizens who mind their own busi-
ness, pay their taxes and do their best to be left alone to pursue
happiness in their lives with such modest resources as they have
been able to accumulate should occupy a lesser position on the
81. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981). The Poletown decision was later reversed in County of Wayne v. Hathcock,
returning the Michigan court to a narrow definition of public use. See County of
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
82. Somin, supra note 79, at 2.
83. See generally id. Somin argues that the economic development rationale
can justify almost any taking that benefits a commercial enterprise. This has been
further exacerbated by the courts' failure to require new owners of property ac-
quired via condemnation to be held accountable through binding legal obligations
for economic promises made. Somin's study analyzes the failure of Poletown
(promise of 6,150 new jobs with actual result of only 60 percent of that number, the
cost of preparing the site for GM was over $200 million to the city of which GM
only paid $8 million; 600 small businesses were condemned resulting in a loss of
approximately 2,500 jobs-thus a net increase in jobs of only approximately 1,200;
plus loss of tax revenue of 600 businesses and 1,200 homes) claims that Poletown
did more harm than good to the city of Detroit. Id. at 7. Somin goes on to say that
the urban renewal programs of the forties and fifties "uprooted hundreds of
thousands of people, destroyed numerous communities, and inflicted enormous so-
cial and economic costs, with few offsetting benefits." Id. at 15.
84. See generally id.
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judicial scale of values than do violent, anti-social members of so-
ciety, whose constitutional rights are assiduously guarded by the
courts.... But axiomatically innocent people have constitutional
rights too, and their legitimate interest should receive a modicum
of fair treatment from the judicial system as well, particularly
when they are being subjected to the trauma of eviction from their
homes and businesses without having done anything to deserve
it.85
Perhaps the backlash arose because we are quite sure that
Madison and the founders never envisioned an end result like
Kelo.8 6
II. Regulatory Takings
Legislative restrictions on property, even if not a title trans-
fer, may give rise to compensation when the regulation goes too
far. However, the Court provides no clear definition of when a
"regulation goes too far." 7 The Court says it has "been unable
to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government rather than remain dispro-
portionately concentrated on a few persons. 88
As the Supreme Court was striking down property rights
via the use of eminent domain, it was, at least consistently, ap-
plying the same lack of respect for property rights in those cases
that were not blatant, obvious takings. At least in the eminent
domain arena, one could tell that it was a taking. But without
so clear a line as a transfer of title, the courts have muddled
through defining exactly what constitutes a taking. The Su-
preme Court says they have "been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated
by the government rather than remain disproportionately con-
centrated on a few persons."8 9 The evolution of the decisions
85. Kanner, supra note 40, at 230.
86. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). "As for the victims, the
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources
to those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse result." Id.
at 505. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
88. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
89. Id.
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show how the Court, absent a blatant transfer of property, is
unclear about defining a taking and testing whether a taking
has occurred. A loss of less than total economic value is not con-
sidered a taking, although a regulation, if it "goes too far," can
be considered a taking.90 So what is the definition of "too far?"
In 1978, the Court held that the denial of a permit to build
an addition to Penn Central Terminal based on the Landmarks
Preservation Law did not constitute a taking.91 New York City
had enacted a landmarks preservation law in 1965 that identi-
fied selected properties of historic or aesthetic interest within
the city. In addition to other facets of the regulation, the
Landmarks Preservation Law subjected the designated proper-
ties to a variety of building and development restrictions. Most
applicable for the purposes of this discussion was that "the
Commission must approve in advance any proposal to alter the
exterior architectural features of the landmark or to construct
any exterior improvement on the landmark site .... "92 Penn
Central submitted two separate alternative plans for review
under this law to build fifty stories atop Grand Central termi-
nal. The City denied both applications, claiming that the plans
were "nothing more than an aesthetic joke"93 and "that the re-
strictions on the development of the Terminal site were neces-
sary to promote the legitimate public purpose of protecting
landmarks ... therefore, the appellants could sustain their con-
stitutional claims only by proof that the regulation deprived
them of all reasonable beneficial use of the property."94 Penn
Central filed suit claiming the denial of the application was a
"taking" requiring just compensation. Penn Central premised
their argument to the Court on two factors: first, the air space
above the terminal is a valuable property interest and second,
the Landmarks Law deprived them of any gainful use of their
air rights above the terminal. "[I]rrespective of the value of the
remainder of their parcel, the city has 'taken' their right to this
[space], thus entitling them to 'just compensation' measured by
90. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
91. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
92. Id. at 112.
93. Id. at 118.
94. Id. at 119.
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the fair market value of these air rights."95 Second, "New York
City's regulation of individual landmarks is fundamentally dif-
ferent from zoning or from historic-district legislation because
the controls imposed by New York City's law apply only to indi-
viduals who own selected properties."96
The Court reviewed three factors to analyze whether a reg-
ulation that destroys the economic value of a property is a tak-
ing or not: "the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant ... the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with [the] distinct investment-backed expectations [of the
claimant, and] the character of the governmental action."97 The
Court held that there was not a taking of private property that
required just compensation. The City's regulation was held to
be a valid protection of the people. Penn Central could go on
using the terminal and building as it had in the past, but the
airspace above the terminal could not be identified and mea-
sured as separate from the terminal. Thus, although Penn Cen-
tral was more severely burdened by the regulation, it was not
unfairly singled out as a property owner to bear the burden of
the regulation. In other words, Penn Central was not denied all
economic value from the property, and the regulations were, ac-
cording to the Court, substantially related to the promotion of
the general welfare.
The dissent (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens),
however, pointed out that of the over one million buildings and
structures in the City of New York, only 400 had been singled
out for designation as official landmarks. The designation im-
posed substantial cost on the land owner with no offsetting ben-
efit. "The question in this case is whether the cost associated
with the city of New York's desire to preserve a limited number
of 'landmarks' within its borders must be borne by all of its tax-
payers or whether it can instead be imposed entirely on the
owners of the individual properties."98 Here, a multimillion dol-
lar loss was imposed on Penn Central. "[It [was] uniquely felt
and is not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation
95. Id. at 130.
96. Id. at 131.
97. Id. at 124.
98. Id. at 139 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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of some 400 other 'landmarks .. . ."'99 "The city of New York,
because of its unadorned admiration for the design [of the Ter-
minal], has decided that the owners of the building must pre-
serve it unchanged for the benefit of sightseeing New Yorkers
and tourists."100 This goes much further than simply prevent-
ing noxious uses.
In 1992, the Court did, however, acknowledge that if a
landowner was deprived of all beneficial use by a regulation,
that this was the equivalent of a physical appropriation and
was therefore a taking that merited "just compensation. "1 1 In
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,102 Lucas purchased
two beachfront parcels on the Isle of Palms to construct homes,
in conformity with the adjacent parcels. Subsequent to the
purchase, the South Carolina Coastal Council enacted the
Beachfront Management Act, which barred Lucas from building
permanent habitable structures on the lots. In an uncharacter-
istically clear holding in takings jurisprudence, the Court
stated that a categorical treatment was appropriate where "reg-
ulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."10 3 The Court further concluded that
there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that
when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave his [or her] property economically idle, he [or she]
has suffered a taking. 10 4
Thus, even if the regulation was a valid exercise of police power
to protect the health, safety, general welfare and morals of the
people, deprivation of all use constituted a taking requiring just
compensation.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,05 the Court developed the "es-
sential nexus" test,10 6 also known as the rough proportionality
test, for exactions cases in which developers are required to
transfer property rights to municipalities as a condition of de-
99. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1015.
104. Id. at 1019.
105. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
106. Id. at 391.
2007] 147
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
velopment approvals. In exaction cases, the Court requires an
essential nexus to exist between the legitimate state interest
and the permit condition exacted by the city. Further, the "tak-
ing" must be roughly proportional to the state interest. Flo-
rence Dolan applied for a permit to redevelop the site of her
plumbing store, which included substantial expansion of the
building and the parking lot. The City granted her permit ap-
plication on the condition that Ms. Dolan deed portions of the
property to the City for a bicycle path and public Greenway.
The City claimed the Greenway was for flood control; the Court
questioned why a public rather than a private Greenway was
required. "It is difficult to see why recreational visitors tram-
pling along petitioner's floodplain easement are sufficiently re-
lated to the city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding
problems along Fanno Creek, and the city has not attempted to
make any individualized determination to support this part of
its request. '10 7
In sum, if a regulation deprives an owner of all of the value
of his or her property, it is a taking subject to just compensa-
tion. If the regulation or exaction deprives the owner of some-
thing less than all economic value, it is subject to the essential
nexus/rough proportionality test of Dolan or the even less exact
considerations enumerated in Penn Central. Worse, if the regu-
lation deprives an owner of something less than the entire value
and is construed as a valid police power regulation, there is no
compensable taking.
III. Expanded Police Powers in Zoning Regulations and Its
Crossover into Takings
The Court tries to make a distinction between regulations
that track the common law of nuisance (which never give rise to
takings liabilities)08 and legislative restrictions on title (which
may give rise to compensation claims). 0 9 Early jurisprudence
dictated that laws preventing noxious uses, thus protecting peo-
ple from specific harm, could not result in a compensable tak-
ing. Over a century of jurisprudence, however, has transformed
107. Id. at 393.
108. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 28, at 111.
109. Id. at 113.
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this notion of protecting an individual from a specific harm. To-
day any land use regulations that are established for the gen-
eral welfare, including aesthetic and architectural regulations,
are generally allowable with no compensation provided to the
property owner. Further, so long as the restrictive regulation is
not arbitrary and capricious, it is treated with great deference
by the courts.
In the period following the formation of this country, re-
strictions on property rights were primarily limited by the law
of nuisance. In essence, should one's use of land inflict injury
upon another, the use would be subject to an injunction. 110
By the turn of the century, this narrow restriction on pri-
vate property rights was expanded via significantly broader
uses of police power. In Eubank v. City of Richmond,"' the Su-
preme Court reviewed local legislation that allowed the commit-
tee on streets to establish a building line a specified number of
feet from the street. The Court held that this type of regulation
was generally not outside of the police power, but that this par-
ticular instance, when "part of the property owners fronting on
the block determine the extent of use that other owners shall
make of their lots ... " it was an unreasonable exercise of the
police power. 112
In the 1915 case of Reinman v. City of Little Rock,113 even
though it was a long established business, Reinman Stables
challenged a new ordinance that prohibited the maintenance
and operation of livery stables in densely populated areas of the
city. The Court held that it was clearly within the police power
of the state to regulate the business and to "declare that in par-
ticular circumstances and in particular localities, a livery stable
110. ELY, supra note 8, at 60.
Much of the nuisance litigation was directed at emerging industrial activity
that caused offensive odors or excessive noises. Such obnoxious trades as
pigsties and glue factories were treated as per se nuisances .... [N] oise
caused by rock quarrying or smoke from a flour mill that harmed adjacent
landowners could also constitute a nuisance.
Id.
111. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
112. Id. at 143.
113. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
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[should] be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law, provided this
power is not exerted arbitrarily .... "114
[T]he general subject of the regulation... is well within the range
of the power of the state to legislate for the health and general
welfare of the people. . . . [Clonsiderable latitude of discretion
must be accorded to the lawmaking power; and so long as the reg-
ulation in question is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and
arbitrary, and operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situ-
ated in the particular district ... it cannot be judicially declared
that there is a deprivation of property without due process .... 115
A. Modern Zoning
In 1922, the United States Department of Commerce issued
the State Zoning Enabling Act. 116 As a model law, it was de-
signed to be used by the states, and provide a clear message
that "the adoption of zoning laws is within the legal authority of
municipal governments." 117 Shortly thereafter, all fifty states
adopted some form of zoning regulation. 118
Two cases in 1925 indicate the shift in thinking about an
individual's right to use his or her property. First, in Goldman
v. Crowther,1 9 Goldman conducted a small, basic tailoring busi-
ness in the basement of his home, which was located in a resi-
dential district. All work was done by hand or on an ordinary
sewing machine. Goldman was arrested for this activity be-
cause it violated Baltimore's zoning ordinance. He then applied
for a permit and was denied. On appeal, the court held that the
ordinance was void because it deprived Goldman of those
guaranties [sic] of the state and federal Constitutions which as-
sure to every citizen the right to hold and enjoy and use his prop-
erty in any manner he pleases, so long as he does not thereby
injuriously affect the health, security, or welfare' of his neighbor
114. Id. at 176.
115. Id. at 176-77.
116. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1926), available
at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingActl926.pdf.
117. JOHN R. NOLON & PATRICIA E. SALKIN, LAND USE IN A NUTSHELL 68
(2006).
118. Id.
119. 128 A. 50 (Md. 1925).
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or the public as the words 'health, security, and welfare' have
hitherto been understood in this state. 120
In 1926, the Supreme Court rendered a decision validating
the constitutionality of a local zoning ordinance that separated
the town into different districts for different uses in the seminal
case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.12 1 The 1922 ordi-
nance enacted a comprehensive zoning plan. It divided the vil-
lage into six classes of use districts (i.e. single family, multi-
family, apartment houses, retail), three classes of height dis-
tricts (i.e. buildings may be no higher than 35 feet, 50 feet, or 80
feet depending on the district), and four classes of area districts
(i.e. single family residential requires 5,000 square foot lot,
apartment buildings must have minimum 2,500 square foot lot).
At the time of the zoning enactment, Ambler Realty owned
sixty-eight acres of land it claimed it had been holding for the
purpose of selling for industrial uses, "for which it is especially
adapted, being immediately in the path of progressive indus-
trial development .... "122 The zoning ordinance would have
severely reduced the value of Ambler's land. The market rate
for industrial land was $10,000 per acre versus the residential
market rate of only $2,500, and the majority of Ambler's land
was now restricted to single family residential. Ambler claimed
that "the ordinance attempts to restrict and control the lawful
uses of appellee's land, so as to confiscate and destroy a great
part of its value .... ,,123 In this case, which followed so closely
on the heels of the State Zoning Enabling Act, the Court stated:
"This question involves the validity of what is really the crux of
the more recent zoning legislation, namely, the creation and
maintenance of residential districts, from which business and
trade of every sort ... are excluded .... "124 The Court further
stated:
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws .. .must
find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted
for the public welfare.... Thus the question whether the power
exists to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for
120. Id. at 53.
121. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 390.
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a particular use .. .is to be determined .. .by considering it in
connection with the circumstances and the locality. 125
The Court went on to describe specific justifications under po-
lice power. It is noteworthy that the justifications were couched
in terms of safety and protection, an attempt to position area
and use zoning in terms of old common law nuisance:
[SIegregation of ... buildings will make it easier to provide fire
apparatus ... that it will increase the safety and security of home
life ... prevent street accidents ... decrease noise ... which pro-
duce or intensify nervous disorders .... 126
The decision goes on to elaborate on the "parasitic" nature of
apartment buildings which would "utterly destroy[ ]" the resi-
dential character of the neighborhood. 127 Under these circum-
stances, apartment houses that "would be not only entirely
unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to being
nuisances.128
In spite of any social change that may have been driving
the zoning enactment in the Village of Euclid, the Court says
that the "reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from
saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 129 Thus, the Su-
preme Court in essence declared that zoning regulations prop-
erly derived from the State Zoning Enabling Act will be found
Constitutional.
Once given the green light, it did not take long for munici-
palities and the Court to move from this timid, nuisance based
interpretation of the Zoning Enabling Act to an extraordinarily
broad interpretation. By 1925, in the famous Berman v.
Parker130 decision, the Court said:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The val-
ues it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to de-
125. Id. at 387-88.
126. Id. at 394.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 395.
129. Id.
130. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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termine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled. 131
In the Court's new definition of public welfare, the tradi-
tional police power-protection from harm-is almost an after-
thought as seen in the last clause "as well as carefully
patrolled."1 2 The definition of "the general welfare" has become
so broad that it would be difficult to find anything that even the
most junior legislator would not be able to argue falls under
"general welfare." Thus, the only actions that will be excluded
are those that can be found to be "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable."133
Eighty years later, we do not find anything unusual or
troubling about a zoning regulation that segregates a shop from
a single family residence or that restricts a tailor shop in a resi-
dential neighborhood. It is interesting to note that the modem
urban renewal movement now finds this separation of uses en-
vironmentally and economically unsound. 134
But what will the next eighty years bring? In an environ-
ment where the only restriction on zoning laws is that they may
not be arbitrary and capricious, how far will the rights of indi-
vidual property owners be restricted? In an environment where
zoning laws are enacted at the most local level for local inter-
ests, does the "parasitic apartment house" become simply a eu-
phemism for exclusionary zoning?
B. Form-Based Land Development Regulations: The
Regulation of Aesthetics-A Good Idea Gone Too Far?
The latest trend in degradation of individual property
rights, empowered by the expansive definition of police power
and supported by judicial deference (or is it abdication?) to local
legislation, is form-based land development regulations. These
are most notably aesthetic-based regulations most often found
under the nomenclature of architectural guidelines, design re-
view, or historic district requirements.
131. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. James Constantine, America's New Traditional Neighborhoods, in TRAnDi-
TIONAL NEIGHBORHOOD DESIGN 8-10 (Jason Miller & R. John Anderson eds., 1997).
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Whatever the label chosen, these regulations go far beyond
typical zoning regulations relating to lot size, building height,
yard setbacks, lot coverage, and the like. Major momentum for
the movement is derived from the west coast, where major cities
enacted "municipal regulations devolving certain authority on
design review boards to make aesthetic determinations.' 135 To-
day these regulations have become more widespread, and ad-
dress "the details of relationships between buildings and the
public realm of the street, the form and mass of buildings in
relation to one another, and the scale and type of streets and
blocks."136
While the holding in Kelo sparked outrage on the part of
property rights activists, no such reaction has occurred in re-
sponse to the emergence of the architectural/design review
board, even though it can mandate the color a homeowner may
paint his or her home, or dictate the type of fence the owner can
use, and even determine the color of mortar that can be used
between the bricks in a re-pointing. Cases challenging the deci-
sions of these review boards are few and far between and even
fewer hold in favor of the plaintiff.
While the goal of these aesthetic based regulations is some-
times admirable (although more often than not they stem from
the interest of a grass roots group that is reacting to somebody
who just put up a house they do not like), and while these regu-
lations appear to have judicial support, there are serious issues
that need to be addressed before declaring victory for this type
of regulation.
The application of criteria for any aesthetic based review is
by definition subjective. In spite of the subjective nature of the
regulations, courts generally allow government control of aes-
thetics, and they continue to defer to local authority.' 37 The
term "authority" takes on an interesting connotation. In a case
that highlights the incredibly subjective nature of these regula-
tions, an architect designed a home for himself in an exclusive
135. Robert J. Sitowski & Brian W. Ohm, Form-Based Land Development
Regulations, 38 URB. LAW. 163, 164 (2006).
136. Id.
137. Paul Weinberg, Zoning for Aesthetics: Who Decides What Your House
Will Look Like?, 28 No. 9 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT 1 (Salkin & Young
eds., 2005).
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neighborhood of metropolitan St. Louis. The house complied
with all zoning codes but required approval from the architec-
tural board of review. The regulation required that the review
be comprised of three architects. Thus, the case is an example
of architects reviewing architects. The board denied the appli-
cation, and the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the decision
because the plaintiffs "highly modernistic residence in this area
where traditional Colonial, French Provincial and English
Tudor styles of architecture are erected does not appear to be
arbitrary and unreasonable when the basic purpose to be served
is that of the general welfare of persons in the entire commu-
nity."138 The regulation required that the design
conform to certain minimum architectural standards of appear-
ance and conformity with surrounding structures and that un-
sightly, grotesque and unsuitable structures, detrimental to the
stability of value and the welfare of surrounding property, struc-
tures and residents, and to the general welfare and happiness of
the community, be avoided, and that appropriate standards of
beauty and conformity be fostered and encouraged. 39
The court held that this ordinance was sufficiently detailed,
denying the plaintiffs argument that it should be void for
vagueness and "provide [s] no standard nor uniform rule ....
Thus, the court holds that "grotesque," "unsuitable" and "appro-
priate standards of beauty" are sufficiently specific to be consid-
ered standards.' 4 '
In Novi v. City of Pacifica,142 the court held that "ordi-
nances precluding uses that would be detrimental to the 'gen-
eral welfare' and precluding developments that would be
'monotonous' in design and external appearance are not uncon-
stitutionally vague.' 1 43 So, in Missouri one cannot design a
home that is too unique; 44 in California, one cannot design con-
dominium projects that are too similar.145 How can abuse be
prevented when the standards are so vague?
138. Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Mo. 1970).
139. Id. at 306-07.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 215 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Ct. App. 1985).
143. Id. at 439.
144. Stoyanoff, 458 S.W.2d at 310.
145. Novi, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
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In 1998, the California Court continued its support of vague
ordinances relative to design reviews. In Breneric Associates v.
City of Del Mar,146 the court upheld a statute that stated: "The
purpose of design review is to protect the aesthetic quality of
the community 'by fostering and encouraging good design which
encompasses the use of harmonious materials and colors [and]
compatible proportional relationships." 147 The Design Review
Board (DRB) may deny a permit if "the design is not harmoni-
ous with.. .the surrounding neighborhood.., and if '[t]he pro-
posed development fails to coordinate the components of
exterior building design on all elevations with regard to color,
materials, architectural form and detailing to achieve design
harmony and continuity.' 1 48 Just what does "harmonious"
mean and by whose standards is it to be measured? How would
an applicant be provided notice in order to comply with such
legislation? Worse, why should applicants be denied a permit
because their tastes are different?
What follows from the lack of specificity in allowable stan-
dards is an uneven application of the regulation or, more specif-
ically, abuse. Who was in office at the time and who was
appointed to the review board may have a great impact on how
such subjective regulations are interpreted. Further, over a
longer period of time, officials change, as do the "leanings" of
those appointed to review boards. Hence, it would become pos-
sible to recognize new homes and renovations simply by the era
of the elected politician at the time. Because those who sit on
review boards are largely appointed by those currently in office,
the environment is prime for zoning of a town based on the
NIMBY (not in my back yard) principle as it applies to a select
few. Here, a homeowner may be faced with a well-organized
neighbor who brings a large crowd to a public hearing. The ap-
pointee, who does not want to disappoint his friend who ap-
pointed him, notes the large, vocal crowd, and he is swayed to
one side or the other of that very subjective regulation.
Further, the checks and balances between legislative and
judicial review no longer provide a proper balance. Municipali-
ties implement architectural review regulations under the aus-
146. 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (Ct. App. 1998).
147. Id. at 328.
148. Id. (citing Del Mar Municipal Code § 23.08.077).
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pices of police power to promote the general health, safety and
welfare of its constituents. In turn, the judiciary provides great
deference to legislation enacted at the local level, so long as the
local legislators can show that the regulations promote the gen-
eral welfare. Therefore, only in instances of blatant abuses of
police power will the judiciary overturn an architectural review
board decision.
Are design guidelines a good thing? Who would stand in
opposition to regulations which purport to maintain our lifes-
tyle or maintain the beauty of our neighborhoods? The ramifi-
cations of these guidelines, however, must be clearly
understood. For instance, how costly are these guidelines to the
homeowner? A specification that prohibits the use of vinyl sid-
ing ($1.52/sf) and requiring all natural materials ($3.74/sf)149
greatly increases the cost of renovation. In an age where it has
now been proven that the middle class is being squeezed, design
guidelines are the worst kind of deception: they purport to be
saving the middle class from "ugly developments," while in fact
what they are doing is pushing the middle class out of their
neighborhoods. The very heart of American ideals is freedom
and individual expression. Do we not have the right to express
ourselves?
V. Concluding Remarks
American property rights are under attack. It has taken
almost two centuries to eradicate the fundamental right to
property protected (or so we thought) by the Takings Clause.
The reality is that today we hold our property subject to the
desires of the local legislative body. Any decision that body
makes with regard to property will be supported in the courts so
long as the decision is not clearly arbitrary. The restriction that
a decision may not be arbitrary protects us only from a timing
149. MEANS RESIDENTIAL DETAILS CONSTRUCTION COSTS CONTRACTOR'S PRIC-
ING GUIDE 2006 at 111-112 (Robert W. Mewis ed., 2006). In this simple example,
the cost of siding a home in cedar will be more than double the cost of siding the
same home in vinyl. Considering that many people construct additions on their
home to care for elder parents, or provide an apartment to provide additional in-
come to meet a growing tax problem, a municipality that imposes this kind of regu-
lation is certainly imposing a burden. Often these regulations are "spun" in
mantra of preserving our lifestyle.
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perspective. (Give any politician enough time and he or she can
come up with a reason that is not arbitrary.) The standard of
review is so low, and the authority endowed to these bodies is so
broad, that it is hard to enumerate a list of things they could not
do. It is the perfect environment for abuse.
History indicates that the "cost" of additional regulation
has been borne by a minority of landowners, and if the histori-
cal trend continues we are in danger of returning to a feudal
property system. 150 The feudal lord will be an entity called a
"public-private partnership." The private portion of the part-
nership will be the entity which has enough power and/or
money to influence the local governing body. Only those enti-
ties with very deep pockets will survive. Without the protection
of the Fifth Amendment, the individual property owner stands
little chance of keeping his or her property if the public-private
partnership wants it. 15 1 As Steven Eagle so aptly states, "Kelo
implicitly suggests that the touchstone has changed from the
owner's right to use property, subject to the obligation to do no
harm, to the owner's affirmative obligation to use property in
ways that benefits the community-lest that property be taken
away and vested in others."1 52
However, the increasing pressures on natural resources
and the inability to provide workforce housing leaves little
doubt that land use must be regulated. Three principles must
return if we are to protect our fundamental right to property as
we try to develop appropriate legislation:
* That there is a fundamental right to own and enjoy property,
endowed to us by our Constitution;
" That this fundamental right can sometimes come with a nega-
tive effect, in that our neighbor may very well paint his or her
house purple, even if purple is not to our taste. This is similar
to our principled belief in the importance of free speech, even if
our sensitivities are offended when someone wears a jacket that
says "Fuck The Draft" on it;153
150. E.F. Roberts, supra note 20.
151. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Poletown Neighbor-
hood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
152. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo v. City of New London: A Tale of Pragmatism Be-
trayed, in EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT 210 (Dwight H.
Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross eds., 2006).
153. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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* That benefits provided to all people should not be provided at
the expense of a handful of property owners.
We, as an American people, believe in educating all of our
children. We vote for this belief through the payment of tax dol-
lars which fund the public school system. A similar model can
be developed to support our land use goals. If there is a true
need for a regulation that infringes upon an individual's prop-
erty rights, the affected property owner should be compensated.
(Today the reality is such that a regulation may decrease the
value of a property by ninety-five percent but will provide no
compensation to the owner). The source of compensation for the
property owner may come from tax incentives or pooled tax
funds established for these purposes. If our society believes
that everyone is entitled to benefits such as open space and
clean water, then all taxpayers should share the burden of pro-
viding those benefits. Stealing land (and property rights) from
select individuals to provide a benefit for the greater good is an-
tithetical to the Constitution.
Alternatively, abuse of power can be avoided if local munic-
ipalities develop specific programs that facilitate neighborhoods
in developing their own covenants rather than imposing them
by legislative means. In theory at least, if it is truly the wish of
all members of a neighborhood, rather than just a vocal minor-
ity, to maintain a particular character or architecture, then re-
strictive covenants are far stronger than zoning laws, and far
more inclusive.
There appears to be no easy answer. It will take the best
and the brightest to deliver compromises that are effective. We
can, however, be sure that without the recognition, participa-
tion, and input from all voices, rational solutions will elude us.
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